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INTRODUCTION 
The criteria for municipalities to utilize a process of debt 
adjustment has caused controversy from the time of the first proposals 
to include municipal debtors within federal bankruptcy law.1 Much of 
the current puzzle arises from the requirement that a municipality must 
be “insolvent” to be eligible to enter the federal bankruptcy process.2 
The definition of insolvency for these purposes varies from that which 
applies elsewhere under the Bankruptcy Code. Under most of 
bankruptcy law, a debtor is “insolvent” if its liabilities exceed its 
 
  Max E. Greenberg Professor of Contract Law, NYU School of Law. My 
thanks to participants at a lecture at Michigan State University College of Law, to 
David Blankfein-Tabachnick, Patrick Rose, Eric Scorsone for their very helpful 
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conversation. 
 1. See Clayton P. Gillette & David A. Skeel, Governance Reform and the 
Judicial Role in Municipal Bankruptcy, 125 YALE L.J. 1150, 1167–84 (2016) 
(providing a history of municipal debt adjustment under federal bankruptcy law). 
 2. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(3) (2018). 
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assets, a standard balance sheet test.3 That is not, however, the test in 
the case of municipalities. For Chapter 9 purposes, an insolvent 
municipality is one that is in such a financial condition that it is 
generally not paying its debts as they become due, which essentially 
involves a cash flow test, or is unable to pay its debts as they become 
due, which has been broadly interpreted as a prospective inability to 
pay test.4  
These tests have created a series of issues. A municipality that is 
“generally” not paying its debts is not necessarily deferring payment 
on all its obligations. Failure to pay some debts will not qualify, 
especially if those debts comprise a small portion of the debtor 
municipality’s budgeted expenditures.5  
The second test of “prospective” non-payment has proven more 
problematic. It requires some conception of how far into the future one 
must look to determine prospectivity. The court in the Bridgeport 
bankruptcy case concluded that to be found insolvent, a debtor 
municipality must prove that it will be unable to pay its debts as they 
become due in its current fiscal year or, based on an adopted budget, 
in its next fiscal year.6 Prospective evaluations also require some 
conception of what localities are required to do in the interim to avoid 
nonpayment. In theory, localities can raise taxes or other service 
charges in an effort to generate the cash necessary to pay creditors, at 
least up to the amount of any tax limitation to which the locality is 
subject. The court in the Detroit bankruptcy, for example, concluded 
that the city could not legally increase taxes.7 Within the domain of 
 
 3. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(A) (2018). The insolvency test has been in place 
since prior to 1988. However, even prior to that time, the balance sheet test made little 
sense as applied to municipalities because municipal assets would not be available to 
creditors in the event of bankruptcy. Thus, the value of assets exceeding liabilities 
would not be an indicator of fiscal capacity to satisfy debts. See generally Nicolas B. 
Malito, Municipal Bankruptcy: An Overview of Chapter 9 and a Critique of the 
“Specifically Authorized” and “Insolvent” Eligibility Requirements of 11 U.S.C.A. § 
109(c), 17 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 517 (2008) (arguing that municipalities should be 
allowed to file after reaching a “zone of insolvency”). 
 4. See § 101(32)(C); see also, e.g., In re Town of Westlake, 211 B.R. 860, 
865 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1997) (discussing the prospective aspect of the test); In re City 
of Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332, 336–38 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991). 
 5. See In re Boise Cty., 465 B.R. 156, 171 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2011) (finding 
that nonpayment of some debts did not amount to general nonpayment of debts). 
 6. See City of Bridgeport, 129 B.R. at 338 (concluding that estimates of a 
city’s position beyond a fiscal year are unreliable). 
 7. See In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 121 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013); see 
also In re Pierce Cty. Hous. Auth., 414 B.R. 702, 711–12 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2009) 
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what is legally available, courts have disagreed about the scope of a 
locality’s discretion to exercise revenue raising authority.8 In In re 
Boise County, the court concluded that the county could issue warrants 
to meet emergency expenditures not anticipated in the annual budget, 
and those emergency expenditures included payment of the judgment 
that had caused the county to file for Chapter 9 protection.9 In In re 
Sullivan County Regional Refuse Disposal District, however, the court 
refused to require a debtor to increase assessments in an effort to pay 
its debts and avoid insolvency.10 The court concluded that the failure 
to increase assessments was relevant to the issue of conducting 
negotiations in ‘‘good faith’’ with creditors, but not to the question of 
insolvency.11 
But it is not clear that tax increases, even if legally available and 
politically plausible, will necessarily generate additional revenues. 
Tax increases may motivate those who bear the relevant burden to exit, 
triggering a downward spiral of property values that causes net 
revenues actually to decline. The popularized version of a “Laffer 
Curve”12 has been more rigorously demonstrated through models of 
municipal budgets that reveal how increases in taxes generate 
proportional losses of city jobs and residents, with the consequence 
that net revenues decrease.13 The court in Bridgeport may have 
implicitly been endorsing a revenue hill test when it concluded that 
the city’s assertion of insolvency depended in part on the claim that 
“anything more than a modest tax increase would be 
counterproductive.”14 The court in the case of In re Corcoran 
Irrigation District was more explicit in concluding that a debtor had 
reached “tax saturation” where increases in rates were legally 
 
(concluding that the debtor was not authorized to increase rents or sell property to 
raise revenues). 
 8. See generally Kevin Kordana, Tax Increases in Municipal Bankruptcies, 
83 VA. L. REV. 1035 (1997) (discussing numerous court decisions on the subject). 
 9. See 465 B.R. at 172–73, 178–80. 
 10. See 165 B.R. 60, 75–76 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1994). 
 11. Id. at 76. 
 12. John Patrick Hunt, Taxes and Ability to Pay in Municipal Bankruptcy, 91 
WASH. L. REV. 515, 534–35, 570 (2016) (noting the “Laffer Curve” implies that, at 
some point, a taxation rate will raise less revenue than a lower rate of taxation). 
 13. See Andrew Haughwout et al., Local Revenue Hills: Evidence from Four 
U.S. Cities, 86 REV. ECON. & STAT. 570, 570 (2004). 
 14. In re City of Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332, 335 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991). 
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permissible but would have created a situation in which the “taxpayer 
or toll payer” could not pay.15 
Embrace of a theoretically sound test of the revenue generating 
possibility of tax increases, however, does not translate into a readily 
available means of measuring insolvency. Certainly, courts are not 
well positioned to calculate the proximity of a locality’s financial 
position to the top of its revenue hill, and efforts to deploy more 
econometrically sophisticated analyses are likely to invite a battle of 
experts rather than a reliable quantification of taxing capacity. Courts 
are likely left with more broadly based, back-of-the-envelope 
calculations of debt-paying capacity, often without a guideline for 
satisfaction of the insolvency requirement. As Vincent Buccola notes, 
financial distress is a conclusion extracted from a probabilistic 
evaluation of future events; hence, “one observer’s insolvency is 
another’s mere illiquidity.”16 Nor is insolvency a necessary predicate 
for the kind of debt overhang that precipitates distress, since the 
inhibition of investments that accompanies excessive debt but that is 
necessary for the municipality to recover from fiscal distress can occur 
even without formal insolvency.17  
Moreover, the insolvency tests appear to reflect a desire for 
mathematical precision disembodied from the ostensible objective that 
underlies them. Insolvency inquiries are directed at the issue of 
whether a locality occupies a fiscal situation sufficiently dire to 
warrant adjustment of outstanding debts. Debt reduction, after all, is 
what Chapter 9 is all about—as evidenced by its formal, if overlooked, 
title in the Bankruptcy Code, “Adjustment of Debts of a 
Municipality.”18 Given that creditors have relied on promises of 
payment sufficiently great to warrant constitutional protection through 
the Contracts Clause, and that failure to pay debts in full is likely to 
increase future borrowing costs for the defaulting municipality, the 
process of debt adjustment should not be undertaken lightly. 
 
 15. 27 F. Supp. 322, 326–27 (S.D. Cal. 1939), aff’d sub nom. Newhouse v. 
Corcoran Irrigation Dist., 114 F.2d 690 (9th Cir. 1940). 
 16. Vincent Buccola, The Logic and Limits of Municipal Bankruptcy Law, 86 
U. CHI. L. REV. 817, 839–40 n.91 (2019).  
 17. See id. at 842 n.101. 
 18. See In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 138 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013) (“It 
long has been understood that bankruptcy law entails impairment of contracts.” 
(quoting In re City of Stockton, 478 B.R. 8, 15 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012))). See 
generally Gillette & Skeel, supra note 1 (contending that the scope of Chapter 9 
should be read more robustly specifically to encompass reorganization of municipal 
governance structures, but that hopeful objective is in service of reducing the need for 
municipal debt adjustment in the future). 
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Notwithstanding that a city’s financial position at the time it files 
under Chapter 9 may reveal “heartbreaking” evidence of the 
breakdown of basic municipal functions,19 there must be some 
mechanism to balance the fiscal and physical distress suffered by 
municipal residents against the moral hazard that accompanies any 
effort to offload obligations to nonresidents and future residents, and 
the losses that will be suffered by creditors who have relied on 
payment in making their initial investments to fund municipal 
services.20 That might particularly be the case where a municipality’s 
creditors comprise nonresidents or pensioners who are unlikely to 
receive future benefits from a financial recovery facilitated by 
compromise of debts. Arguably, the insolvency requirement plays that 
balancing function.  
That is not to say that the municipality is solely responsible for 
its fiscal distress and thus should not have ready access to mitigation 
of the debts it has incurred. Reductions in federal and state aid to cities 
may come as exogenous shocks that disrupt local budgets.21 A political 
decision at the state level to impose limitations on a municipality’s 
ability to raise revenue through taxation can greatly limit local fiscal 
flexibility.22 In California, the imposition of Proposition 13 led to a 
44% reduction in the available tax base for localities nearly two 
decades after its passing.23 Debts may be incurred for projects that, ex 
ante, have a significant probability of success but that, ex post, look 
like bad investments given the drain that the related debt service has 
on local budgets. For example, in events that precipitated the 
 
 19. Christine Sgarlata Chung, Municipal Bankruptcy, Essential Municipal 
Services, and Taxpayers’ Voice, 24 WIDENER L.J. 43, 71 (2015) (describing the state 
of affairs in pre-bankruptcy Detroit). 
 20. See Austin Murphy, Bond Pricing in the Biggest City Bankruptcy in 
History: The Effects of State Emergency Management Laws on Default Risk, 54 INT’L 
REV. OF L. & ECON. 106, 106 (2018) (noting as an example that while the Detroit 
Emergency Financial Manager successfully increased the expected returns to current 
bondholders, the long-run value of Detroit bonds was negatively impacted in the 
following years, which would impair capital-raising efforts in the future).  
 21. See Mike Maciag & J.B. Wogan, With Less State Aid, Localities Look for 
Ways to Cope, GOVERNING (Feb. 2017), https://www.governing.com/topics/ 
finance/gov-state-aid-revenue-sharing-intergovernmental-revenue.html [https:// 
perma.cc/579M-R7WQ]. 
 22. See PEW CHARITABLE TR., THE LOCAL SQUEEZE: FALLING REVENUES AND 
GROWING DEMAND FOR SERVICES CHALLENGE CITIES, COUNTIES, AND SCHOOL 
DISTRICTS 3 (2012) (discussing the effects of Michigan and California’s property tax 
reform on municipal funding). 
 23. LINCOLN INST. OF LAND POLICY, EROSION OF THE PROPERTY TAX BASE: 
TRENDS, CAUSES, AND CONSEQUENCES 7 (Nancy Y. Augustine et al. eds., 2009).  
1216 Michigan State Law Review  2019 
bankruptcy of Jefferson County, both underwriters and corrupt state 
officials misrepresented the economic viability of a massive municipal 
sewer project.24 Broader economic shocks may reduce property 
valuations or the capacity of residents to pay property taxes, leading 
to significant shortfalls in municipal revenues. In the year following 
the financial crisis of 2008, state and local government revenues were 
reduced by nearly 22%, while expenditures increased by 4%, forcing 
many municipalities to turn to debt financing to meet service 
obligations.25 The bankruptcy process may take those causes into 
account when formulating and confirming a plan for adjustment of the 
locality’s debts. In the Detroit case, for example, the State of Michigan 
contributed $194.8 million to the plan to settle claims that it had 
underfunded Detroit pensions.26  
Moreover, if one believes that fiscal distress is often the 
consequence of a failure to monitor municipal fiscal performance, one 
might conclude that the solution is to place greater risk on those who 
have superior monitoring capacity. I have argued in the past that 
creditors may better satisfy that role than residents.27 If that is the case, 
then one might be more willing to adjust debts in order to induce 
creditors to exercise their superior monitoring capacity.  
Nevertheless, the eligibility decision to which the insolvency 
requirement is relevant serves as an odd entry point for analysis of the 
causes of fiscal distress. Instead, in determining whether the 
bankruptcy process is to be invoked, the financial position of the 
debtor locality is best taken as given. How the locality reached its 
position may be an important factor in creating a plan that both 
resolves an existing debt crisis and inhibits its reemergence. A locality 
that enters bankruptcy because changes in state funding policies have 
starved its municipalities of anticipated funding may benefit from a 
plan that restores state funding. But in attempting to determine 
whether the locality is suffering from fiscal distress sufficiently 
significant to consider impairing obligations to creditors—that is, 
whether the bankruptcy process should be invoked at all—the manner 
 
 24. See In re Jefferson Cty., 491 B.R. 277, 281 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2013). 
 25. Christine Sgarlata Chung, Government Budgets as the Hunger Games: 
The Brutal Competition for State and Local Government Resources Given Municipal 
Securities Debt, Pension and OBEP Obligations, and Taxpayer Needs, 33 REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 663, 695 (2014).  
 26. In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147, 170–73 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014).  
 27. See Clayton P. Gillette, Bondholders and Financially Stressed 
Municipalities, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 639, 664, 670 (2012) (addressing the use of 
“[c]reditors as [s]ubstitute [m]onitors” as “[s]urrogates for [b]ondholders”). 
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in which the locality arrived at its position seems less germane. 
Nevertheless, the ambiguity inherent in the insolvency requirement 
renders it a blunt instrument for any effort to define whether 
conditions warrant the considerations of debt adjustment that Chapter 
9 contemplates.  
These difficulties have led to various recommendations to 
modify the insolvency requirement. Vincent Buccola suggests that the 
requirement is too restrictive, if not unnecessary, because destructive 
underinvestment can precede the actual or prospective appearance of 
a cash flow crisis.28 Laura Coordes suggests elimination of the 
requirement, arguing that it provides little information about the 
municipality and prevents distressed municipalities from seeking the 
relief that they might obtain from readjustment of debts.29 She suggests 
that any inquiry into insolvency instead be made at the confirmation 
stage.30  
These recommendations seize on the defects of the insolvency 
requirement but do not necessarily solve the problem of defining when 
municipalities should be entitled to judicial consideration of debt 
adjustment. Facilitating entry into bankruptcy through postponement 
or elimination of the insolvency inquiry will, indeed, foster more 
efforts to reduce municipal debt. Many distressed localities certainly 
need some mechanism for offloading debt if they are to function as 
well-operating entities, and it is not clear that those municipalities will 
satisfy even the flexible notions of insolvency. But the absence of an 
upfront gatekeeper could generate overuse or strategic use of the 
bankruptcy process rather than an optimal level of debt adjustment.31 
The mixed motives of local officials, both to preserve the fiscal 
reputation of the city and to favor residents at the expense of 
nonresident creditors, suggest that the decision to petition for relief 
 
 28. See Buccola, supra note 16, at 833.  
 29. See generally Laura N. Coordes, Gatekeepers Gone Wrong: Reforming 
the Chapter 9 Eligibility Rules, 94 WASH. L. REV. 1191 (2017) (“[M]unicipalities in 
fiscal distress should be able to access bankruptcy when they demonstrate a need for 
the primary types of assistance that bankruptcy can best provide . . . .”). See also 
Malito, supra note 3, at 1004 (making an argument similar to Coordes’s position).  
 30. See Coordes, supra note 29, at 1233. 
 31. See generally Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and 
Strategic Use of Municipal Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 281 (2012) [hereinafter 
Fiscal Federalism] (addressing the role of bankruptcy courts in neutralizing strategic 
behavior and, in turn, encouraging localities to internalize costs). See also Buccola, 
supra note 16, at 865 (suggesting that Chapter 9 is underutilized and would remain 
underutilized in the absence of an insolvency requirement because multiple parties 
would still be able to veto its use). 
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under Chapter 9, which only the municipality itself is currently 
permitted to undertake,32 could be skewed in favor of too much delay 
or in favor of too quick of an effort to cancel obligations. Local 
officials whose time horizon is bounded by the next election are likely 
to underweight adverse future consequences of bankruptcies, such as 
the possibility that current debt adjustments will frustrate future efforts 
to enter the debt markets or will generate higher borrowing costs. 
Alternatively, local officials of distressed localities may deploy the 
threat of bankruptcy to obtain leverage in negotiations with state 
officials who fear that bankruptcy by one political subdivision could 
result in contagion effects rippling through other state borrowers.33  
That is not to say that the insolvency requirement is a perfect 
solution to strategic bankruptcy filings. Indeed, the insolvency 
definition may facilitate strategic behavior by providing a 
municipality a discrete definition of what it must do in order to qualify 
for Chapter 9. Objectors to Stockton, California’s bankruptcy petition 
alleged precisely that the City’s insolvency was engineered to comply 
with statutory requirements.34 To the extent that bankruptcy is used 
strategically, it is the ex ante threat of entering the process, rather than 
the propriety of confirming a specific plan for adjustment that is doing 
much of the work. The result is that an insolvency gatekeeper may be 
logically desirable, but too uncertain in its current incarnation to 
provide a reliable basis for concluding that debt adjustment is 
appropriate.  
I. “SERVICE DELIVERY INSOLVENCY” AND ITS JUSTIFICATION 
Perhaps in reaction to the misfit between the need for debt 
adjustment and the ambiguous definition of “insolvency,” a few courts 
have resorted to a more radical interpretation of the insolvency 
requirement. Essentially, they have appended to it a judicial 
emendation that looks less at the inputs of the municipal budget—that 
is, the available revenues—than to the consequences of fiscal distress. 
The result has been what several courts have denominated a “service 
delivery insolvency” test, typically defined in terms of a significant 
reduction in the availability of city services. In In re City of Stockton, 
for example, the court concluded that the city could satisfy the 
insolvency requirement if its financial situation substantially 
 
 32. See 11 U.S.C. § 901 (2018). 
 33. See Fiscal Federalism, supra note 31, at 302.  
 34. See In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. 772, 789 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013).  
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interfered with the “ability to pay for all the costs of providing services 
at the level and quality that are required for the health, safety, and 
welfare of the community.”35 The court that adjudicated Detroit’s 
bankruptcy concluded that the city’s service delivery insolvency was 
evidenced by “deplorable” conditions in policing, inoperable 
streetlights, large numbers of blighted buildings, antiquated 
equipment, and closures of public parks.36 Similarly, the court that 
considered the bankruptcy of Vallejo, California, noted that the city’s 
petition under Chapter 9 proceeded only after it had reduced employee 
rolls and municipal services to the point that further cuts would 
threaten the city’s ability to provide for the basic needs of its citizens.37 
The more recent example of San Bernardino’s bankruptcy 
proceedings focused on the city’s inability to provide both adequate 
police protection to stem rising crime rates and necessary funding for 
infrastructure maintenance and repair.38 A qualitative description of a 
petitioner’s municipal services as significantly reduced compared to 
the level of the services that would be expected of a well-operating 
municipality, in effect, serves as a proxy for the more quantitative cash 
flow analysis that has proven to be elusive. Indeed, while the court in 
the Detroit case considered that the financial status of the city—that 
is, “the City’s tumbling credit rating, its utter lack of liquidity and the 
disastrous [derivatives transaction]”—provided persuasive evidence 
that the technical statutory definition of insolvency had been satisfied, 
Judge Rhodes also concluded that the city’s service delivery 
insolvency was “most strikingly disturbing.”39  
“Service delivery insolvency,” however, poses less than an ideal 
solution to the lack of fit between financial insolvency and the 
propriety of debt adjustment.40 Most obviously, the term lacks 
precision. The courts’ reference to services that would ensure “the 
health, safety, and welfare of the community” leaves open multiple 
issues about whose health, what degree of safety, and how much 
welfare a city is expected or obligated to guarantee.41 Michelle 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. See In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 169 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013). 
 37. See In re City of Vallejo, 408 B.R. 280, 294 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2009). 
 38. See In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. 46, 60 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 
2017). 
 39. City of Detroit, 504 B.R. at 263–64.  
 40. In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. 772, 781 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013). 
 41. Id.; see also In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147, 261 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 
2014) (describing how “service delivery insolvency” means that “the City is unable 
to provide basic municipal services such as police, fire and emergency medical 
services to protect the health and safety of the people here”). 
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Anderson asks the relevant questions concerning the unavailability of 
a standard metric for the proper level of services and questions the 
ability of courts to rely on concepts such as “underfunding”: 
“‘underfunded’ relative to what?”42 But more than the definitional 
issue, the concept of service delivery insolvency assumes some 
baseline level of services that localities are expected to provide to at 
least a subset of residents, and further assumes that creditors, rather 
than residents, plausibly bear the risk that the locality will fail to 
satisfy that baseline.  
Nevertheless, focus on a municipality’s failure to deliver 
services certainly serves as a plausible proxy for fiscal health. After 
all, providing services is what municipalities do. Localities are 
responsible for delivering to residents local public goods, that is, 
goods and services that confer benefits within a relatively narrow 
geographic range but that market mechanisms are unlikely to generate 
at an efficient level. Local governments hold out the promise of 
solving the collective action problems that underlie the mismatch 
between residents’ preferences for goods and services and the 
market’s capacity to offer them.43 The problem might arise because 
potential beneficiaries of a local public good can benefit from its 
provision, even if they fail to contribute to its production. That 
counterintuitive result flows from the possibility that potential 
consumers of a service could not be excluded from receiving its 
benefits, as long as some other beneficiary makes the necessary 
contribution. If all abutters on my bumpy roadway desire to pave our 
street, but none has the capacity to require contributions from the 
others, there is a possibility that all will hold out in an effort to free 
ride on the contributions of others. Thus, the standard market 
mechanism of contracting will fail to provide for the desired street 
paving, since potential free riders will refrain from agreeing to a 
contractual obligation to make payments. Local government provides 
the solution to the provision of local public goods by creating (1) a 
mechanism (elections) through which residents register their 
preferences for a basket of goods and services, and (2) a mechanism 
by which to enforce payment obligations (taxation), which residents 
should be willing to pay since they are getting preferred services in 
return, as long as all other beneficiaries similarly make payments. 
 
 42. Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118, 
1192–94 (2014). 
 43. See LYNN A. BAKER ET AL., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 38–50 (5th ed. 
2015).  
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Alternatively, a public good may be undersupplied because its 
nonrival nature means that multiple people can use it simultaneously, 
at least up to the point of congestion, undermining the efficiency of 
the price mechanism to control access. Think, for example, of concerts 
in Central Park in New York City; profit-seeking providers of concerts 
will not be able to capture all the benefits enjoyed by listeners and thus 
will refrain from arranging the concerts in the first instance. But if the 
market won’t supply the service, then some entity unconcerned with 
profit, such as a local government, must undertake the task.  
Alternatively, local governments provide a solution where goods 
and services will otherwise be undersupplied because they have the 
characteristics of natural monopolies. Under those circumstances, the 
initial capital costs of providing a service may be very high, while 
marginal costs are low. A private entity may be concerned that its 
initial high-capital investment will not be recoverable if competitors 
are permitted subsequent entry and competitive pricing is driven down 
to reflect only marginal costs. Local governments can solve the 
problem by providing the service as a monopolist (or privatizing the 
service to a private monopolist), albeit a publicly interested one that 
does not charge monopoly prices. Common examples include utilities 
such as municipal waterworks or municipal electrical companies.  
The common theme that unites these goods and services is that 
local government provision addresses a market failure that would 
otherwise leave a void in service provision, notwithstanding 
significant demand. Local government intervention becomes all the 
more important given that many of the services that have the 
characteristics of public goods are crucial to a high quality of life. 
These include security (police and fire), transportation (street 
maintenance), and health (sewer and water). The concept of service 
delivery insolvency is implicitly predicated on the understanding that 
if localities fail to provide these services in an adequate manner, 
residents with insufficient mobility will be unable to obtain them from 
any alternative source, given their undersupply in the private market. 
Local government incapacity to provide these services, therefore, 
constitutes an abrogation of the very functions for which the locality 
was created. Arguably, the essential role in providing services that 
would otherwise be undersupplied by market forces, combined with 
the limited mobility of residents who desire but cannot obtain services 
that a locality holds itself out as offering, underlies legal doctrines that 
bind localities to principles of non-discrimination and equal service 
provision, which mandates that all residents of a locality have access 
1222 Michigan State Law Review  2019 
to similar levels of service.44 But the same result of undersupply occurs 
when a municipality fails to deliver promised services through fiscal 
incapacity rather than through discrimination. Thus, even those 
commentators who view the value of municipalities from a 
perspective other than an economic one appear to agree that 
municipalities are created in large part to provide public goods and 
services not available in the market and that the absence of such 
services is the hallmark of fiscal distress.45  
One might predict that local officials, aware of the significance 
of the services within their control, would be attentive to their efficient 
and effective provision. After all, in theory at least, local governments 
compete for residents and firms by offering a bundle of goods and 
services at a tax price that residents are willing to pay. Different 
localities will offer different bundles, so that individuals and firms are 
attracted to those localities that offer the bundle that they find most 
hospitable. In an idealized conception of local government 
competition, first embodied in the classic work of Charles Tiebout, 
each locality within an infinite set attracts an optimal population of 
residents who attain their preferred service at the preferred tax price.46 
Of course, the assumptions of perfect mobility, reliance on dividend 
income, lack of externalities, and infinite supply of municipalities 
underlying the Tieboutian model of local government competition are 
too strong to reflect real world practices (as Tiebout himself 
recognized).47 In addition, David Schleicher has demonstrated how 
local government policies themselves, such as land use laws and 
occupational licensing, inhibit the mobility that would be necessary to 
a full realization of residents’ preferences.48 Finally, localities that 
attract a cluster of residents who benefit from each other’s proximity 
may be able to discourage exit by those residents, even if they do not 
 
 44. See Clayton P. Gillette, Equality and Variety in the Delivery of Municipal 
Services, 100 HARV. L. REV. 946, 947 (1987) (reviewing CHARLES M. HAAR AND 
DANIEL W. FESSLER, THE WRONG SIDE OF THE TRACKS: A REVOLUTIONARY 
REDISCOVERY OF THE COMMON LAW TRADITION OF FAIRNESS IN THE STRUGGLE 
AGAINST INEQUALITY (1986)).  
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 48. See David Schleicher, Stuck: The Law and Economics of Residential 
Stagnation, 127 YALE. L.J. 78, 78 (2017). 
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otherwise obtain their preferred level of public goods.49 That said, 
there is little doubt that localities vary significantly in the goods and 
services that they offer. Nor is there much doubt that, to the extent that 
individuals and firms are mobile and knowledgeable, they have 
incentives to gravitate to localities that offer goods and services that 
approximate their ideal bundle.50  
Local officials, therefore, should strive to maintain the level of 
goods and services preferred by residents, since it is on that basis that 
residents presumably will determine the electoral fate of those 
officials. As the price of services are capitalized into home values, 
homeowning voters determine whether the tax prices they pay to 
reside in a particular locality are worth the service levels they receive. 
Those voters are likely to reward or penalize officials who provide 
those services accordingly.51 Indeed, in the Tieboutian world of perfect 
mobility, local officials should be attentive to residents’ preferences 
even in the absence of a competitive political market. In that world, 
residential decisions are made by individuals who act out of self-
interest in an atomized manner without attention to or concern for the 
decisions of others. If an individual or firm can costlessly move to a 
more hospitable jurisdiction, then there is no need to engage in the 
costly process of coalescing with others in an effort to alter the existing 
bundle of goods and services in one’s current jurisdiction. Outside that 
rarified environment, however, local politics typically consist of 
efforts to achieve compromises or to make choices among competing 
bundles of goods and services. Thus, local politics are likely to revolve 
around municipal performance in the delivery of goods and services: 
housing, garbage collection, schools, street conditions, and the taxes 
levied to pay for them.52 
The result is that residents’ connections to their locality are 
largely defined by service delivery. A locality is unlikely to defer 
provision of desired services unless it is unable to afford them. Service 
delivery below a baseline, therefore, is a plausible proxy for fiscal 
 
 49. See CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, LOCAL REDISTRIBUTION AND LOCAL 
DEMOCRACY 96–102 (2011) [hereinafter LOCAL REDISTRIBUTION]. 
 50. There have been numerous efforts to test the Tiebout hypothesis 
empirically. Although complicated by issues such as the residential choice being 
influenced by income level or non-service characteristics of a jurisdiction, these 
studies tend to show at least some support for jurisdictions that are homogeneous with 
respect to service demand. See, e.g., Lee Hachadoorian, Homogeneity Tests of Tiebout 
Sorting: A Case Study at the Interface of City and Suburb, 53 URB. STUD. 1000, 1000–
01 (2016). 
 51. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 87–89 (2001).  
 52. See id. 
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distress. If (1) mobile residents migrate to specific localities in order 
to obtain a particular basket of goods and services, and (2) local 
officials have electoral incentives to provide the preferred level of 
goods and services, then the absence of that level of goods and 
services is likely to be a consequence of fiscal incapacity to provide it, 
rather than the consequence of some other function. Similarly, absent 
some alternative explanation based on changes in preferences of 
residents, or a desire of officials to underserve their current residents, 
a reduction in service levels which is likely to induce exit by the most 
mobile residents is likely a consequence of fiscal incapacity.53 Thus, if 
courts need a proxy for a degree of fiscal distress that warrants debt 
adjustment, service delivery shortfalls may be the best option. 
II. THE LIMITED UTILITY OF SERVICE DELIVERY INSOLVENCY 
Even if we recognize the theoretical utility of service delivery 
insolvency as a test for the need to adjust debts, its value depends on 
judicial capacity to detect that services have fallen to a level that places 
the “health, safety, and welfare of the community” at risk.54 The few 
courts that have considered service delivery insolvency have referred 
to statistics that concern the delivery of specific services or made bleak 
qualitative statements that have a res ipsa loquitur quality. The court 
in Detroit, for example, noted that “about 40% of the approximately 
88,000 streetlights operated and maintained by the City’s Public 
Lighting Department were not working.”55 The court further relied on 
testimony by the Chief of Police that conditions in local police 
precincts were “deplorable,” that “crime is extremely high, morale is 
low, [and there existed an] . . . absence of leadership.”56 The court’s 
conclusion was that city services “do not function properly due to 
inadequate funding. The City has an extraordinarily high crime rate; 
too many street lights do not function; EMS does not timely respond; 
the City’s parks are neglected and disappearing; and the equipment for 
police, EMS and fire services are outdated and inadequate.”57 
 
 53. There are instances in which local officials deliberately underserve some 
residents and favor others. The latter are likely within the officials’ political base, 
while the former are not. In those instances, under-provision is likely a function of 
political strategy rather than fiscal incapacity. See Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei 
Shleifer, The Curley Effect: The Economics of Shaping the Electorate, 21 J.L. ECON. 
& ORG. 1, 13 (2005).  
 54. In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 168 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013) 
 55. Id. at 120.  
 56. Id. at 169. 
 57. Id. at 189. 
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Similarly, the court in Stockton observed that “[p]olice often respond 
only to crimes-in-progress.”58  
Of course, a locality could always spend more on services, 
though at some point residents may resist tax payments necessary to 
increase service quality or quantity. And it would be the rare chief of 
police or other department head who did not prefer more resources. 
Thus, absolute statements of inadequacy seem insufficient. Perhaps 
the best metric is a comparative one. Given the absence of any single 
metric for striking the balance between taxes and services, the degree 
to which service levels in one locality approach inadequacy may 
depend on what similarly situated localities provide. Some courts have 
taken such an approach to assess the adequacy of services in the debtor 
locality. The comparison may be with services provided in the same 
locality during a prior period, or it may be with service levels offered 
by other localities. The court in Stockton used comparative data of a 
rough sort to conclude that service delivery insolvency existed.59 The 
city’s workforce had decreased by 25% from 2008 to 2011, and the 
police department had about 1.10 officers per one thousand residents, 
compared to a national standard of 2.7 per one thousand residents.60 
The court concluded that Stockton presented the “paradigm example” 
in which service delivery served as a proxy for cash insolvency 
because police services had been “decimated,” with the consequence 
that “crime rate has soared. Homicides are at record levels. The City 
has among the ten highest rates in the nation of aggravated assaults 
with a firearm.”61 The court in the Detroit bankruptcy concluded that 
the city’s violent crime rate was five times the national average and 
that its case clearance rate for violent crimes and for all crimes were 
“substantially below those of comparable municipalities nationally 
and surrounding local municipalities.”62 Although the court in the 
Bridgeport bankruptcy case did not explicitly adopt a service delivery 
insolvency test, it did focus on declines in services as indicative of 
insolvency.63 The court noted, for example, that the Chief of Police 
testified that the department employed only 341 police officers of the 
430 necessary to provide adequate service.64 Similarly, the Emergency 
Financial Manager for Detroit took a comparative approach in an 
 
 58. In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. 772, 790 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013). 
 59. See id. at 780. 
 60. See id. at 780–81. 
 61. Id. at 789–90. 
 62. City of Detroit, 504 B.R. at 120. 
 63. See In re City of Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332, 335 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991). 
 64. See id. 
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effort to convince creditors of a need to adjust debts prior to the time 
that the city filed for bankruptcy.65 The Proposal for Creditors that the 
Emergency Financial Manager circulated, for example, compared 
Detroit’s tax burden ($1,207 per capita) to that of surrounding 
municipalities that would be most likely to attract population and firms 
considering exit from Detroit (which taxed no more than $930 per 
capita).66 The analysis also compared crime statistics, crime clearance 
rates, and other municipal services offered by multiple Midwestern 
cities.67 The Proposal revealed that Detroit fared significantly below 
Pittsburgh, Milwaukee, and St. Louis, and somewhat below Cleveland 
on crime statistics, and well below comparable cities with respect to 
functioning street lights.68 
Each of these comparative strategies is rational. Again, 
reductions in service levels within a locality seem inconsistent with 
the model of local governments as competitors for residents, at least if 
expenditures do not appear to exceed residents’ willingness to be 
taxed. Once localities attract residents on the basis of a specific basket 
of services, one would anticipate that officials will seek to maintain 
those services. Interlocal differences in service levels theoretically 
reflect different constituent preferences, different fiscal capacities, or 
different standards of living. Nevertheless, radical disparities in levels 
of certain services that one would anticipate are widely preferred at 
some minimal level may betoken something other than variations in 
residents’ preferences. In her account of municipal reactions to fiscal 
distress, Michelle Anderson notes that different cities spend at 
significantly different rates for basic services such as policing, which 
one might think are a basic function of virtually every sizeable 
locality, and that relatively poor localities spend at significantly lower 
rates.69 The result is that poor localities with relatively high crime rates 
have staffing ratios about the same as those of wealthy cities with 
relatively low crimes rates. Marginal dollars spent on crime in the 
 
 65. See generally CITY OF DETROIT, PROPOSAL FOR CREDITORS (2013) 
(outlining the Emergency Manager’s plan for debt adjustment in Detroit).  
 66. Id. at 5. 
 67. See id. at 9–12. 
 68. See id.  
 69. See Anderson, supra note 42, at 1161–62 (discussing Aaron Chalfin & 
Justin McCrary, The Effect of Police on Crime: New Evidence from U.S. Cities, 1960-
2010, at tbl.10 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18815, 2013)). 
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former would produce much greater benefits than marginal dollars 
spent in the latter. One might infer that the spending rate reflects 
something other than preferences to live in a crime-ridden area.  
That finding is consistent with judicial focus on crime statistics 
in making comparative judgments, as evidenced by the cases 
mentioned above. The focus on crime makes sense because crime rates 
tend to be a salient factor in firm and individual locational decisions, 
and low crime rates are correlated with urban revival.70 To the extent 
that the service delivery insolvency question purports to represent a 
proxy for fiscal distress, relatively high crime rates associated with 
diluted policing services can deter in-migration by taxpaying 
individuals and firms, and thus are likely to signal local incapacity to 
attract new tax revenues necessary to emerge from economic 
difficulties. Disparities in crime spending among otherwise similarly 
situated localities, therefore, may be both attributable to low fiscal 
capacity and indicative of a financial condition that warrants debt 
adjustment in order to facilitate financial recovery. 
A. Reductions in Service Levels as a Measure of Service Delivery    
Insolvency  
At the same time, using temporal or interlocal comparative 
service levels as a measure of fiscal insolvency poses difficulties. This 
is not simply because the sorting model of local government implies 
variation in the level of publicly provided services among 
municipalities. For my purposes, the more relevant difficulties emerge 
from the assumed connection between low levels of particular services 
and the propriety of designating a locality to be eligible for the process 
of debt adjustment.  
While reductions in services are easy to quantify, their 
consequences (and their causes) are not. Extreme cases such as 
Detroit, where services appear to have declined in quantity and quality 
across the board, are difficult to explain as a consequence of anything 
 
 70. See generally PATRICK SHARKEY, UNEASY PEACE (W.W. Norton & Co., 
1st ed. 2018) (attributing urban revival to declines in crime rates); Paul D. Gottlieb, 
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(finding that the relationship between quality of place (QOP) variables—QOP 
variables are associated with stronger human capital outcomes in large- to mid-sized 
cities—and development outcomes was relatively weak in small cities). 
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other than severe fiscal distress. But counterintuitively, decreases in 
municipal services may be a sign of municipal recovery. That could 
be the case if one of the causes of municipal distress was overspending 
on services relative to taxpayers’ willingness to pay, a condition that 
could have induced exit by taxpayers who were not receiving benefits 
equal to or in excess of the tax costs they were required to bear. In 
short, if municipal service levels had previously been greater than 
optimal, then oversupply may have been at least partially responsible 
for the fiscal distress that placed the locality at risk of bankruptcy. In 
that situation, reductions in services may be a signal that the locality 
is adjusting its spending in a manner that could make offloading debts 
less necessary. 
Tieboutian and political competition explanations of prospective 
residents’ capacity to sort among local governments according to 
service packages essentially deny that service oversupply could exist. 
Those happy stories rely on a process in which residents register 
preferences for service levels through either mobility or an electoral 
system, and responsive local officials comply with the residents’ 
demands. Local officials serve as faithful agents of their constituents, 
as failure to comply with residents’ preferences generates costless exit 
by dissatisfied residents or, where transactions costs impede exit, 
electoral redress in which unfaithful officials are replaced.  
Return, however, to the objections to the Tieboutian model. The 
critique of Tiebout’s assumptions is frequently deployed to 
demonstrate that an untrammeled market for residents will not lead to 
an optimal delivery of municipal services.71 But that same critique 
indicates that the deficiencies that characterize economic markets may 
also affect political markets. The result is that imperfect democratic 
politics do not guarantee ideal service delivery any more than does 
imperfect mobility. For example, the electorate does not vote on a 
service-by-service basis, but rather casts a binary vote on the bundle 
offered by the locality, as represented through candidates for office 
who take positions on specific services. A voter who is content with 
the current level of policing, park services, and schools may vote for 
an incumbent, even though that resident would prefer a level of 
spending on waste collection that deviates from the status quo. But the 
victorious candidate will be unable to disaggregate which policies 
commanded constituent support and which ones were the subject of 
 
 71. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Homes Rule, 112 YALE L.J. 617, 617 (2002); 
Frug, supra note 45, at 33. 
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disagreement.72 As a result, the signal that even faithful officials 
receive from the electoral process is likely to be opaque with respect 
to the desired level of any particular service.  
In addition, much as local government may be a solution to a 
collective action problem that interferes with the provision of local 
public goods, local government itself creates a collective action 
problem. If you participate in the function of governing, I have less 
incentive to do so, as long as I believe that your interests are 
sufficiently aligned with mine that I receive no net gain from incurring 
the costs related to governance. As a result, those who participate in 
governance by running for office, lobbying, or voting are likely to 
receive idiosyncratic, somewhat non-representative benefits from 
those activities that justify incurring the related costs.73 Again, if 
mobility or politics worked perfectly, those with non-representative 
interests would suffer significant obstacles to enacting their agenda. 
Representative residents would be induced to exit, taking their tax 
dollars with them, or to register opposing votes. But where mobility is 
constrained or political activity is reduced because collective action 
problems deter members of the majority from coalescing, those who 
have sufficient interests to participate in governance are more likely 
to seek the benefit of their non-representative positions.  
That is even more likely to be the case where immobility results 
from network or agglomeration effects within a locality. Those effects 
are related to the benefits that individuals or firms receive from being 
located within a network of other individuals or firms. Agglomeration 
effects induce taxpayers (firms or individuals) to remain within a 
locality because they are dependent on other taxpayers who similarly 
reside within the locality. If agglomeration benefits exceed the loss 
that some taxpayers incur by receiving a lower-than-preferred level of 
services, then local officials may decide to provide a level of service 
that is dispreferred by those taxpayers in order to provide a preferred 
level of service to a constituency that is electorally important and that 
is relatively mobile; officials will have less concern that the former 
group will exit because they are geographically locked into their local 
network. Those efforts, however, may ultimately lay the groundwork 
for fiscal distress if agglomeration benefits decline, perhaps because 
 
 72. See LOCAL REDISTRIBUTION, supra note 49, at 15–28 (explaining 
problems with the binary nature of voting in which voters cast ballots for candidates 
rather than for positions on issues). 
 73. See generally Clayton P. Gillette, Who Puts the Public in the Public 
Good?, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 534 (1988) (discussing the roles those who participate in 
governance play in market intervention).  
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at least some of the members of the network exit, or because aggregate 
spending exceeds the value of agglomeration benefits for mobile 
firms. Where that occurs, subsequent reductions of service levels may 
signal that the locality is attempting to correct a previous situation of 
service oversupply rather than a need to adjust debts.  
Consider, for example, the position of New York City just prior 
to its brush with bankruptcy in the 1970s. Martin Shefter calculated 
that in 1975 New York had 45.5 municipal employees per 1,000 
residents with labor costs averaging $19,543 per employee.74 By 
comparison, Chicago had 15.4 employees per 1,000 residents at an 
average cost of $15,102.75 Detroit had higher labor costs per employee 
of $23,424, but only had 14.8 employees per 1,000 residents.76 New 
York’s per capita operating expenditures of $1,330 also exceeded that 
of any of the twelve largest U.S. cities other than Washington, D.C., 
in 1974–75.77 The next highest figure was $823 per capita for 
Baltimore.78 It is at least plausible that high public employee levels in 
New York City indicated that the city was oversupplying municipal 
services relative to demand, perhaps as a function of entreaties by 
special interest groups such as public service unions and organized 
clients of municipal departments.79 If that was the case, then reductions 
in service levels could constitute efforts to reduce costs to an 
affordable level rather than cause for alarm.  
This is not to deny that subsequent reductions in service levels 
will have real and tragic effects on service recipients or providers. Kim 
Phillips-Fein’s account of the consequences on New York City’s 
efforts to reduce costs through service reductions provides a picture as 
bleak as the one that courts have used to illustrate the existence of 
service delivery insolvency. As negotiations for state aid to the city 
stalled, the city laid off more than 5,000 police officers and 
detectives,80 firehouses and municipal daycare centers closed, the City 
University of New York was required to charge tuition for the first 
time in its history, sanitation workers were dismissed, and public 
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transportation fares increased 43%.81 One might conclude from such 
statistics that service delivery had declined into service delivery 
insolvency and thus warranted debt adjustment. But in the case of New 
York City, the reduction may be considered an unfortunate but 
realistic reaction to oversupply that had itself contributed to a 
condition of fiscal distress.  
Of course, courts that have considered service reductions as 
evidence of insolvency have not looked at those reductions in 
isolation. They have also reviewed issues such as legacy costs (debt 
and pension obligations) that limit the amount of dollars available for 
services and increasing crime rates that follow service reductions and 
that might indicate a suboptimal level of service provision. But those 
issues are not easily disaggregated from the possibility of previous 
oversupply. Thus, my claim is not that service reductions are 
necessarily a positive indication that a municipality is engaged in 
efforts to reverse a fiscally dangerous situation without debt 
adjustment. Rather, my point is simply a cautionary one that 
reductions in service do not necessarily indicate the propriety of 
offloading risk related to debt rather than realignment of a limited 
budget.  
B. Measuring Service Delivery Insolvency as an Incentive Device  
Municipalities, I have suggested, exist primarily to provide local 
public goods. General purpose municipalities, as opposed to special 
districts, provide multiple services. A moment’s reflection indicates 
the variety of services from which localities are likely to choose: 
policing, firefighting, education, sewer and water, waste disposal, 
electricity, street paving, street lighting. Localities may also 
legitimately engage in activities that don’t easily fall within the realm 
of public goods, such as redistribution of wealth.82 Localities may not 
elect to provide each of these services or to provide them to all eligible 
residents, as many can be provided at sufficient levels by private 
markets (e.g., electricity) or by more centralized levels of government 
(e.g., redistribution). But it would be a rare local government that was 
not involved in a significant number of these services.83 
 
 81. Id. at 132–44. 
 82. See generally LOCAL REDISTRIBUTION, supra note 49 (discussing the 
orthodoxy of predicting that local governments will not engage in wealth 
redistribution).  
 83. Some localities, however, are formed for the very purpose of avoiding 
the provision of local public goods. That does not mean that residents do not have 
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The few courts that have invoked the concept of service delivery 
insolvency, however, have not done so by conducting a thorough 
review of the service package that the debtor municipality purports to 
provide. Rather, courts have looked selectively at specific services and 
at limited statistics that purport to serve as a measure of the overall 
quality of municipal services. Indeed, as I have indicated above, the 
courts that have considered service delivery insolvency have 
concentrated on police services. The court in Stockton looked at that 
measure to conclude that services in that city constituted “a paradigm 
example of service delivery insolvency.”84 The court in Detroit also 
considered firefighting services, streetlights, and blight, but seemed 
primarily concerned with policing services. It noted, for example, that 
“[i]n 2012, the average priority one response time for the police 
department was 30 minutes. [Then, i]n 2013, it was 58 minutes. The 
national average is 11 minutes.”85 Further, it noted that staffing in the 
police department had been reduced by approximately 40% over the 
prior ten years.86 The court in the San Bernardino bankruptcy justified 
payments by the city of only a small proportion of outstanding claims 
on the grounds that “the City’s high violent crime rates exceed state 
and national averages.”87 As I have noted above, the court in the 
Bridgeport bankruptcy noted the decline in police services, even 
though it did not formally adopt a service delivery insolvency test.88  
A focus on policing and crime rates as measures of service 
delivery generally makes a great deal of sense. I have noted above the 
salience of crime and the relationship between low crime rates and the 
capacity of localities to attract new residents. Nevertheless, there is 
reason to be wary that statistical measures of particular services can 
serve as reliable proxies for insolvency that warrants debt adjustment. 
In the first instance, the salience of crime creates the risk of a lamppost 
effect. The very importance of crime statistics means that they will be 
collected and thus are readily obtainable by courts and commentators. 
 
access to goods and services. Rather, it means that the primary function of the locality 
is to contract out with other public or private providers for the service. A proposed 
locality that purports to fulfill its functions in this manner, however, may be denied 
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Metrics for other services may either be difficult to obtain or require 
long-term calculations less reflective of a locality’s current financial 
condition. For example, while expenditures on schools may be salient 
and may be reflected in short-term and measurable units, such as 
student-teacher ratios, the measurement of school performance may 
be more opaque or more difficult to calculate in the short term. Even 
significant reductions in expenditures may not have immediate effects 
on measures of performance such as graduation rates or test scores. It 
may take longer for reduced funding to reflect declines in either of 
those measures, and the extent to which they reflect quality has long 
been a matter of debate.89 While inputs, such as body counts within 
municipal departments and agencies, may be susceptible to 
measurement, outputs, such as park cleanliness or waste disposal 
efficiency, may be less so than the number of reported crimes. The 
result is that services for which there are readily available measurable 
outcomes may receive disproportionate attention in the insolvency 
analysis, even if the related service levels are not representative of the 
locality’s service package generally.  
Of course, the importance of crime reduction to municipal 
financial performance suggests that some disproportionate attention to 
that service is appropriate. And if specific services are susceptible to 
measurement, one might think that those services will tend to be 
provided at a level higher than the average, since local officials can 
tout those statistics as indicators of high-quality performance. Thus, 
statistics that indicate measurable services are underprovided may 
flash serious warning signals. But the availability of crime statistics 
and the tendency of courts to focus on those metrics that are readily 
available may actually create perverse incentives to undersupply those 
services. Once courts adopt service delivery insolvency as a measure 
of eligibility for Chapter 9 and announce the kinds of service 
deficiencies that satisfy eligibility standards, local officials who see 
net benefits in adjusting debts have incentives to shift scarce resources 
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1234 Michigan State Law Review  2019 
in ways that satisfy the criteria that courts have adopted.90 Officials 
who desire to demonstrate the existence of service delivery insolvency 
can reduce service levels for those services that are susceptible to 
measurement and that courts have used to determine bankruptcy 
eligibility, notwithstanding that residents would prefer that those 
services be maintained at relatively high levels. Officials who wanted 
to demonstrate insolvency might not withhold funds that could 
otherwise be deployed to provide services, since retaining cash would 
demonstrate that the locality did not satisfy the cash flow test. But 
local officials could spend available resources in suboptimal ways in 
order to strengthen the case for shifting a greater share of the costs of 
fiscal distress from residents to creditors by adjusting debts.  
The risk of suboptimal spending is an example of a more 
generalizable phenomenon of strategic budgeting. When the quality of 
an activity is multidimensional, some dimensions of which can be 
monitored or observed at low cost and some of which can only be 
monitored or observed at high cost, qualitative judgments about the 
activity may be based only on the low-cost dimensions. A potential 
consequence is that actors whose performance is being evaluated will 
tend to distort behavior towards those dimensions that are likely to be 
evaluated. In some cases, the effect may be to raise the level of 
performance with respect to the measured dimension because the actor 
anticipates a reward from achieving a high level. But the same 
incentive may produce a low level of performance with respect to the 
measured dimension because the actor anticipates a subsidy (e.g., debt 
adjustment) if performance falls below a certain level.91 In either case, 
the result may be to provide suboptimal quality, since those 
dimensions that are readily measurable, and thus provided at a high or 
low level of quality, are imperfect proxies for the quality of the entire 
activity being evaluated.  
Think, for example, of the debate concerning whether evaluating 
teachers by reference to students’ test scores fosters a culture of 
“teaching to the test” that may distort incentives of teachers to 
generate more creative thinking that may be better educationally but 
that is less susceptible to measurement. Alternatively, consider that 
tort law measures negligence by reference to the exercise of care on a 
specific occasion, which is susceptible to monitoring (at least ex post), 
while activity levels, which will also affect accident rates but is less 
 
 90. See Fiscal Federalism, supra note 31, at 319–24 (noting the discussion 
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 91. See id. at 300. 
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susceptible to monitoring, are not considered in the negligence 
calculus.92 Analogously, Russell Korobkin suggests that courts should 
focus on non-salient contract terms when evaluating the inherently 
multidimensional nature of unconscionability, because market forces 
(including consumers and firms) are likely to focus only on salient 
terms in appraising the desirability of a contract.93 
The existence of a perverse incentive to undersupply preferred 
services may seem inconsistent with the self-interest of local officials. 
After all, I have postulated above that local officials have incentives 
to act in a manner that maximizes opportunities for re-election, and 
that objective is not well served by the suboptimal provision of salient 
services, such as policing. In addition, to the extent that defined 
interests can distort the budgetary decisions of local officials, one 
might imagine that organized public sector employees would 
constitute an effective group against the artificial reduction of the 
services that they provide. But the desire to offload debt to ultimately 
have additional resources to provide needed services to residents may 
serve as a powerful counter to those forces, as evidenced by the 
willingness of local officials to enter Chapter 9, notwithstanding the 
inevitable risks that doing so pose for discrete interests that include 
subgroups of residents such as pensioners or public sector 
employees.94 Indeed, to the extent that courts have tended to favor 
local pensioners or employees over nonresident bondholders, as in 
Detroit, local officials may be able to convince residents such as 
employees that short-term costs they suffer from fiscal distress can be 
offset by long-term benefits available only through bankruptcy 
eligibility.  
Ultimately, the issue of whether the presence of both observable 
and unobservable measures of quality for a multidimensional activity 
perversely distorts decision-making is an empirical one. But studies of 
analogous decisions by municipal officials provide at least some 
evidence for the claim that local officials prioritize expenditures 
strategically. Figlio and O’Sullivan, for example, found that local 
officials whose budgets are subject to tax caps with electoral overrides 
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allow services that are salient to constituents to deteriorate, while 
funding for less salient administrative services remains at relatively 
constant levels.95 That finding is consistent with a prediction that local 
officials will make decisions that increase the likelihood that voters 
will approve a tax cap override. In their study, Figlio and O’Sullivan 
found that the ratio of uniformed police officers to police 
administration and the ratio of teachers to school administrators 
increased after imposition of a tax limit in no-override jurisdictions. 
But those ratios decreased in jurisdictions that allowed electoral 
overrides.96  
In separate studies, Figlio concluded that schools subject to tax 
limitations reduce instructional budgets more than administrative 
budgets.97 Phuong Nguyen-Hoang concluded that small city school 
districts in New York that held budget referendums tended to reduce 
instructional spending and increase student-teacher ratios while 
preserving administrative spending.98  
Contrary evidence does exist. Dye and McGuire concluded that 
tax limitations in Illinois reduced total operating expenditures by 
school districts, but did not reduce instructional spending.99 But the 
existence of some evidence of budget manipulation belies the 
assumption that rational local officials, who presumably have re-
election as a primary objective function, would not reduce salient 
services that jeopardize the likelihood of electoral success. 
Certainly, pervasive low levels of services, reductions in basic 
services, increases in crime rates, or deterioration of infrastructure are 
indicia of an inability to balance a municipal budget, and thus evidence 
of insolvency that is remediable through debt adjustment. It is not 
clear, however, that service delivery insolvency can serve as a valid 
proxy for a locality’s fiscal capacity when conclusions about that 
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condition are predicated on selective evidence, especially evidence 
that may be non-representative or vulnerable to manipulation.  
III. ALTERNATIVE OR COMPLEMENTARY MEASURES OF INSOLVENCY 
I have suggested that service delivery insolvency, albeit 
theoretically rational as a basis for bankruptcy, suffers from 
measurement difficulties, potentially weak causal relationships 
between service reductions and the need for debt adjustment, and 
incentives it creates for strategic reductions in service.100 Even if I am 
correct, the response would not necessarily be to abandon the concept 
of service delivery insolvency as a measure of the need for debt 
adjustment. Again, local service delivery defines the nature and 
objective of local governments, so failure to provide local public 
goods is certainly relevant to the question of a need to enter the 
bankruptcy process.101 Is there, then, some means by which to refine 
or supplement the concept of service delivery insolvency when 
determining eligibility for Chapter 9? I conclude with observations 
about two potential measures that may serve as alternative or 
complementary proxies for the need to adjust municipal debt.  
One common characteristic of distressed cities is population 
decline. Significant exit may be the proverbial canary in the coal mine. 
That conclusion follows from the assumption above that localities 
attract taxpayers by offering a basket of goods and services at a tax 
price that potential residents find attractive. The implication is that a 
city that charges tax prices but fails to provide desired services at a 
level commensurate with those prices, perhaps because too many tax 
dollars are spent servicing legacy debt, are likely to lose mobile 
residents. Moreover, since bankruptcy involves adjustment of 
outstanding debt, shrinking population may be a valid measure of 
eligibility, since population declines imply that the per capita debt of 
the municipality is increasing, and plausibly doing so in a manner that 
induces additional exit.  
Certainly, population declines seem to have some relationship 
with insolvency. The court in the Detroit bankruptcy classified the 
city’s 63% decline in population between 1950 and 2012 as one of the 
causes of fiscal distress.102 Indeed, Detroit’s population decreased by 
25% from 2000 to 2010 and has continued to decline from 714,000 in 
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2010 to approximately 673,000.103 New York City’s population 
declined from 7.9 million in 1970 to under 7.1 million in 1980, a 
decade of fiscal crisis and economic decline.104 Anderson documents 
other cases in which cities lose significant portions of their population, 
including a dramatic decline in East St. Louis from 82,000 to 27,000 
over a fifty-year period.105 
Population declines, however, may overdetermine fiscal 
distress. We tend to think of population increases as the norm and thus 
identify population declines with the presence of a pathology. But 
some cities adapt to population declines and either thrive or at least 
avoid severe fiscal distress. Pittsburgh is often held up as a model of a 
city that has survived transition from a manufacturing economy, even 
though its population has declined from 370,000 in 1990 to a current 
population of under 302,000.106 Philadelphia’s current population of 
approximately 1.58 million matches its population in 1990, even 
though it had dipped to 1.44 million in 1998.107 In short, some cities 
are able to respond to population declines in a manner that avoids debt 
adjustment. Nevertheless, there are barriers to adjusting to a reduced 
population, not the least of which is that fixed cost of legacy debt 
means that those who remain within a municipality are likely to bear 
a higher per capita cost to pay for expenditures from which no new 
benefit can be expected. As municipal budgets are subject to 
constraints, high legacy costs leave less discretion for municipal 
officials to pay for additional goods and services that might stabilize 
or augment current delivery levels. For example, the court in Detroit 
concluded that “[d]uring 2012, 38.6% of the City’s revenue was 
consumed servicing legacy liabilities. The forecasts for subsequent 
years, assuming no restructuring, are 42.5% for 2013, 54.3% for 2014, 
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59.5% for 2015, 63% for 2016, and 64.5% for 2017.”108 Since the 
alleviation of debt burdens is a primary objective of bankruptcy 
proceedings, declining population may signal the propriety of using 
Chapter 9. 
Population declines may also underdetermine fiscal distress. The 
population of Vallejo remained relatively static during its period of 
insolvency, increasing slightly from 116,600 in 2000 to over 120,000 
in 2014.109 Stockton’s population increased from approximately 
292,000 to just under 305,000 between 2010 and 2015.110 San 
Bernardino’s population remained relatively stable during that same 
period.111 This phenomenon seems inconsistent with Tieboutian 
sorting, which predicts significant exit from localities that offer few of 
the services that residents prefer. But it is consistent with findings that 
mobility among Americans has declined generally and particularly 
within areas that have suffered significant job losses—findings on 
which David Schleicher relies to study the effects of local government 
policies on inhibiting exit.112 To the extent that unemployed or 
underemployed workers fail to migrate to areas where jobs exist, thus 
entrenching low employment rates in distressed cities, it is population 
stability, rather than population decline, that may foreshadow a need 
to offload debt.  
That brings me to my final point about the utility of service 
delivery insolvency as a measure of the need for municipal debt 
adjustment. Population changes may be relevant to the inquiry to the 
extent that one recognizes that population statistics entail more than 
just numbers. The importance of significant exit for the insolvency 
determination may depend on who exits. If those who exit consumed 
more services than they paid for, then exit will not necessarily betoken 
fiscal distress. I am not suggesting that those who are subsidized are 
necessarily the relatively poor. The relatively wealthy may enjoy 
benefits from services like police and fire protection disproportionate 
to their payments simply because they have more property that is 
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being protected or because some of their costs are offset by 
abatements.  
But if those who exit tend to be net payers, i.e., those who pay 
more in taxes than they receive in services, then their departure leaves 
fewer residents to support increased per capita expenditures, thus 
creating the “death spiral” noted by some courts and commentators.113 
An equally disruptive reaction by relatively wealthy residents who 
prefer not to exit would be to vote for a reduction of public services 
for which they can find substitutes in the private market. Think, for 
example, of individuals and firms who substitute private security 
guards for policing, private garbage pickup for public sanitation, 
private schools for public ones, or country clubs for public parks. The 
consequence is that some public services could deteriorate 
significantly, notwithstanding population stability, as mobile residents 
remain, but substitute privately supplied goods for publicly provided 
ones, and immobile residents remain, but suffer service reductions. I 
am not recommending such a course of action, given its inevitable 
distributive effects. I am, however, observing that even stable 
populations in cities with significant income inequality may suffer 
from a deterioration of publicly provided services that may cry out for 
remedy, including the possibility of debt adjustment. 
Relatedly, even where exit occurs, it is unlikely to be evenly 
distributed throughout a municipality. Where those who exit are either 
tenants or homeowners who have surrendered their homes due to 
inability to pay carrying costs, and who are not replaced by new 
residents, there is a risk that exit creates deserted pockets even within 
otherwise robust areas of cities. Michelle Anderson documents that 
“[i]n San Bernardino, California, for instance, 876 units became 
unoccupied in just three years (2006-2009), and many of those 
vacancies were spatially concentrated in particular neighborhoods.”114 
Detroit may be the poster child for such effects. The bankruptcy court 
concluded that the city contained 78,000 abandoned and blighted 
buildings that had to be demolished at an average cost of $8,500 per 
structure.115  
The externalities of vacant pockets on a neighborhood are well 
documented. Blighted or vacant land affects perceptions of safety, and 
for good reason, since those same areas are associated with higher 
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rates of crime, violence, and nuisance.116 But the relevant point for 
insolvency relates back to the prior discussion concerning what allows 
cities to thrive in the first instance. I noted above that the Tieboutian 
model of sorting through highly atomized, apolitical individuals is 
disrupted by the presence of agglomeration benefits.117 There is a 
significant literature that reveals that agglomeration effects increase 
the productivity of a locality.118 Those benefits arise from different 
forms of agglomeration, but their common characteristic is that they 
involve interactions among different individuals or firms within small 
geographic spaces. The interactions may be among competitors who 
share ideas and develop jointly what neither would develop 
individually.119 Or it may involve different firms that cooperate as 
suppliers, buyers, transporters, or advisors.120 Think of the desire of a 
firm to reduce transactions costs by locating nearby its customers on 
both the buyer and seller side, its transportation network, its bank, and 
its attorneys. Or it may involve interactions among individuals from 
different cultures who use similar products for different purposes, a 
phenomenon that may be as simple as people who make different 
foods from the same products, or who use playing fields for different 
games, in each case allowing more efficient use of the commonly used 
resource. Agglomeration benefits of this nature typically take the form 
of knowledge spillovers from one group of individuals to another. 
John Quigley’s demonstration of a relationship between diversity and 
economic growth relies explicitly on such sharing of resources and 
information.121 Agglomeration of firms can also reduce spatial 
mismatches between jobs and place of residence, a phenomenon that 
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researchers suggest especially adversely affects black workers.122 
Neighborhood effects, in which institutions necessary to the 
development of social capital are created and supported, increase 
economic outcomes by providing references that may enhance job 
opportunities.123 The positive benefits of agglomeration are 
sufficiently great that some commentators have celebrated the recent 
withdrawal of Amazon from New York City as a location for its HQ2 
as creating the prospect that the firm will form smaller clusters of 
employees in other locations, thus generating more agglomeration 
effects in localities more needful of them.124  
As I have noted above, agglomeration may distort decision-
making by prompting residents to remain when they might otherwise 
emigrate because they would lose network benefits in excess of the 
gains they would obtain from exit. A firm that receives benefits from 
proximity to other firms is unlikely to exit, notwithstanding that the 
municipality charges for services that the firm does not utilize, as long 
as those charges do not exceed the value of its current locational 
benefits. Those same benefits may be essential to the economic growth 
of cities, largely because they allow the formation of clusters, each 
member of which has incentives to remain, even if those same 
members would exit under the conditions that underlie Tieboutian 
sorting. Agglomeration benefits, however, require the density that 
characterizes urban areas, and the repeat play among community 
members that characterizes successful urban areas. There is at least 
some evidence that agglomeration benefits dissipate rapidly beyond 
short geographical distances.125 Thus, those who wish to take 
advantage of these benefits cannot readily migrate far from the cluster 
that generates them; instead, they must stay in a relatively 
concentrated geographic area. 
In short, maybe Jane Jacobs was right after all. While she did not 
speak in the economic jargon of agglomeration, her appeal that cities 
serve as a focal point for “all kinds of diversity, intricately mingled in 
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mutual support,” amounts to a description of agglomeration benefits. 
It was on this basis that Jacobs advocated the mixed uses of 
neighborhoods, the need to “hamper excess duplications at one place, 
and divert them instead to other places in which they will not be excess 
duplications, but healthy additions,” and the “convenience of being 
very close to one another.”126  
But understanding the potential of agglomeration for the 
economic development of localities also reveals the converse. At some 
point, the costs imposed on firms and residents for services from 
which they do not benefit may become so great as to outweigh the 
agglomeration benefits associated with residing within a municipality. 
At that point, mobile residents and firms have incentives to exit rather 
than to remain and perhaps to induce similarly situated residents also 
to exit and to form a new cluster elsewhere. To the extent that 
agglomeration is responsible for retaining interdependent residents 
and generating economic value for the municipality, exit by members 
of the network implicates the potential for additional residents to exit, 
since each individual departure reduces the agglomeration benefits 
available to those that remain.  
That does not mean that agglomeration affects all residents or all 
residents to the same degree. Some industries may not be very 
concentrated or connected with other local firms, so that the loss of a 
firm from the locality does not necessarily signal significant loss of 
agglomeration benefits.127 Other industries, however, may be 
sufficiently concentrated that departure by multiple members could be 
associated with a loss of agglomeration benefits sufficiently great to 
cause fiscal distress that could not easily be redressed without some 
form of intervention. The exit of insurance companies from Hartford 
may be more problematic than the exit of other firms of equal size, 
simply because it signals a potential breakdown of an existing cluster. 
Agglomeration effects could also be affected by city size or by the role 
of a particular firm within the local network. For example, Hanlon and 
Miscio conclude that the presence of local suppliers is crucial to city 
growth.128 Loss of local suppliers, one might argue, is therefore a 
stronger signal of continuing fiscal distress without intervention than 
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the loss of other firms. Similarly, they find that within-industry 
agglomeration effects are less than across-industry effects for 
purposes of city growth.129 Thus—and perhaps contrary to my example 
of Hartford above—exit by a firm in an industry that remains well 
represented in the city may be less important than loss of a firm that is 
not otherwise represented.130 Other researchers similarly find that the 
character of firms affects the extent to which they generate 
agglomeration benefits within a locality. Rosenthal and Strange, for 
example, find that agglomeration economies that arise from spatial 
concentration in a given industry dissipate rapidly if a firm is located 
within five miles of same-industry firms.131 In short, even if exit and 
population decline do not necessarily signal fiscal distress, the identity 
of who exits may matter. 
Theoretically, therefore, an understanding of the sources and 
consequences of agglomeration could tell us a great deal about the 
fiscal prospects of distressed localities and about specific measures 
that localities might take to enhance fiscal stability.132 Combes and 
Gobillon note the potential of measuring agglomeration economies:  
Generally speaking, an accurate estimation of the magnitude of 
agglomeration economies is required when one tries to evaluate the need 
for larger or smaller cities. If one were to conclude that the current city size 
distribution is not optimal, such an evaluation [would be] necessary for the 
design of policies (such as taxes or regulation) that should be implemented 
to influence agents’ location choices toward the social optimum.133 
More to the point, demonstrable declines in agglomeration benefits 
could, more than population declines or rough measures of service 
delivery insolvency alone, inform judgments about the potential 
sources of fiscal distress and the likelihood that debt adjustment would 
be appropriate. If population decline is largely attributable to exit by 
firms that tend to generate local agglomeration benefits, then 
continued and declining fiscal distress is more likely to occur without 
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intervention than if population decline results from exit that creates 
less of a reduction of those benefits.  
Analyzing the consequences of depopulation in this manner, 
however, requires measurements of agglomeration with a degree of 
reliability and consistency that has thus far eluded researchers. Even 
prominent researchers in the field conclude that “the empirical quest 
to accurately measure such economies has proven to be quite 
difficult.”134 The initial inquiry into the existence of agglomeration 
benefits is relatively straightforward. Take, for example, the initial 
issue of whether firms or employees in a region are clustered enough 
to suggest that agglomeration effects might be a factor.135 To measure 
how specialized a region is, one can either focus on the physical 
location of plants or look at relative employment within a particular 
industry in a region.136 The physical location of an industry’s plants 
determines the concentration of a particular industry’s plants in a 
region relative to the concentration of plant locations for all other 
industries within that region.137 The resulting “dissimilarity 
measurements” will have a value of zero if the relative spatial 
distribution of an industry in a region is comparable to the distribution 
of all other industries.138 To examine labor pooling, one can measure 
the share of employment in a particular industry within a region 
relative to all other occupations of employment within the region.139 A 
dense metropolitan hub might have both spatial concentrations of 
offices and many people employed within a particular industry. One 
of the better-known examples of this phenomenon would be 
California’s Silicon Valley and its focus on technology.  
Once agglomeration is established, however, the scope and value 
of the subsequent benefits is more difficult to calculate. The 
significant literature that discusses measurement of agglomeration 
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effects reveals significant variation in both methodology and results. 
For example, different studies use employment, population, density, 
or production as the relevant variable to measure local economy 
size.140 To some extent, the variations reflect the different sources of 
agglomeration benefits, each of which is susceptible to different units 
of measurement. Those benefits may arise as a consequence of 
reduced transportation costs, as when suppliers and buyers locate near 
each other; or from the exchange of ideas where density facilitates 
frequent interactions among individuals and firms; or because dense 
labor markets permit more efficient matching of jobs and skills.141 
Thus, a full understanding of a firm’s contributions to the 
agglomeration economies within an area would have to determine how 
best to measure each of those possibilities.  
But even researchers who focus on a single source of 
agglomeration benefits may not agree on how best to determine their 
scope. Debates exist in the literature, for example, over issues such as 
whether and how to measure the effects of industrial diversity within 
a locality,142 whether productivity—if used as an indicator of 
agglomeration effects—should be measured by total factor production 
or wages,143 and the point at which congestion among firms within a 
locality could actually negatively affect local productivity.144 Data 
problems affect the reliability of many studies and methodological 
approaches.145 Endogeneity issues may complicate the effort to 
disaggregate agglomeration benefits from other factors that affect 
productivity, as when a variable missing from the calculation 
influences both local outcomes and local characteristics, or when 
 
 140. See, e.g., Combes & Gobillon, supra note 132, at 271. 
 141. See Glaeser & Gottlieb, supra note 134, at 1001–14. 
 142. See, e.g., Gilles Duranton & Diego Puga, Micro-Foundations of Urban 
Agglomeration Economies, in 4 HANDBOOK OF REGIONAL AND URBAN ECONOMICS 
2063, 2064 (J. Vernon Henderson & Jacques-François Thisse eds., 2004); Combes & 
Gobillon, supra note 132, at 276–77. See generally Rosenthal & Strange, supra note 
125 (discussing broadly “how the organization of economic activity . . . affects the 
value of agglomeration”).  
 143. See Combes & Gobillon, supra note 132, at 282–84. 
 144. See, e.g., Pierre-Philipp Combes & Miren Lafourcade, Competition, 
Market Access and Economic Geography: Structural Estimation and Predictions for 
France, 41 REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 508, 510 (2011) (acknowledging the 
overcrowding issue).  
 145. See, e.g., Combes & Gobillon, supra note 132, at 247, 268 (discussing 
issues with study variables and suggestions for resolving them); Hanlon & Miscio, 
supra note 118, at 2 (discussing historical issues with data availability).  
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workers make location decisions based on individual characteristics 
for which there has not been any control in the specification.146 
Nevertheless, it is not clear that the imprecision inherent in 
measurements of agglomeration benefits undermines their utility as a 
gauge of the need for debt adjustment. That is true for two reasons. 
First, the task of the court is not to measure the loss of agglomeration 
benefits with exactitude. Even rough measures of agglomeration 
reductions may be sufficient to send the signal for which a court is 
looking, that is, that there is sufficient evidence of irreversible fiscal 
distress to foresee a downward spiraling local economy without some 
form of fiscal intervention.  
Second, even if one acknowledges that agglomeration benefits 
are crucial to the economic success of a municipality, there may be 
proxies for the loss of those benefits that are more amenable to judicial 
interpretation than economic studies. A municipality presumably 
seeks residents who can generate aggregation benefits because those 
effects increase productivity within the locality. Increased 
productivity should be capitalized into land values, so that increases 
in agglomeration effects should be reflected in higher property values 
within the municipality.147 Conversely, a reduction in local 
agglomeration benefits should be accompanied by a reduction in local 
property values. While property valuation procedures may be opaque, 
reductions in property values over time should be observable by 
courts, by looking, for instance, at residential and commercial sale and 
rental statistics over time or from property tax calculations based on 
metrics that have been applied consistently over time. Of course, 
reduced property values could reflect many factors other than a decline 
in agglomeration benefits. And population declines will typically be 
accompanied by reductions in property values in the short term, 
simply because those declines imply that the existing housing stock 
faces reduced demand. But that does not mean that declines in 
population, property values, and agglomeration are similarly 
correlated in all cases. Again, the objective of the judicial inquiry is 
not to establish with scientific certainty that agglomeration benefits 
have declined to a given extent. Rather, the objective is to determine 
whether that decline is sufficiently severe to warrant debt adjustment 
as a means of allowing a municipality to recover from fiscal distress. 
 
 146. See Combes & Gobillon, supra note 132, at 3. 
 147. See, e.g., Matthew Drennan & Hugh F. Kelley, Measuring Urban 
Agglomeration Economies with Office Rents, 11 J. ECON. GEOGRAPHY 481, 481–82 
(2011) (measuring agglomeration economies by examining changes in office rents in 
urban areas). 
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Thus, some direct, albeit imprecise, measures that reveal a decline in 
agglomeration benefits, in tandem with more precise evidence that 
property values in the distressed municipality have declined by a 
greater extent than can be accounted for by lower demand alone, may 
be at least useful evidence for satisfying the statutory requirement of 
insolvency. 
CONCLUSION 
Courts and commentators who have sought an appropriate 
metric to balance the need for municipal debt relief and the 
expectations of creditors have rightly focused on the inadequacies of 
current legal measures. Service delivery insolvency provides a certain 
degree of promise insofar as it reflects both the failure of a locality to 
supply the public goods for which the municipality has been created 
and the low prospects of recovery without some degree of fiscal 
intervention. In practice, however, the use of service delivery failure 
as a proxy for insolvency suffers from its own inadequacies of 
susceptibility to mismeasurement, non-representativeness of one 
service for the entire bundle of municipal services, and the possibility 
that it will be vulnerable to strategic manipulation. Other potential 
stand-alone proxies, such as population declines, are at best indicative 
of fiscal distress, but provide insufficient evidence of the need for debt 
adjustment. The developing inquiry, if not science, of measuring the 
agglomeration economies that are the defining characteristic of dense 
urban areas may offer some promise for an evaluation of a locality’s 
current fiscal condition and future fiscal prospects. To the extent that 
inquiry into the loss of agglomeration benefits, either alone or 
combined with other measures, can be harnessed with some reliability, 
courts may be able to make better predictions of the need for and 
desirability of using the bankruptcy process to balance municipal 
service needs and creditor expectations.  
 
